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ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs do not appeal the judgment of the Court with regard to the dismissal of the
underlying action in this case. This appeal stems only from the wrongful submission of an
award of attorney fees and the inclusion of a finding of fraud and bad faith in the order
submitted by the Defendants. Those items were not awards made by the Fourth District
Court in the original case. Nor were they issues even broached during the hearing in which
the Court dismissed the matter.
I.

Plaintiff's Appeal was Timely.

The order of the Court which is the subject of this appeal was entered on January 9,
2004. Plaintiff filed its notice of appeal 30 days later. It is clear from the notice of appeal
that Plaintiff does not appeal the actual order of the lower court, rather it appeals the form
of the judgment which was submitted six months after the court's order was entered and
included language which was originally not contemplated by the lower court. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff's appeal was untimely because it was not filed within 10 days as
required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and additionally by the time
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-11(2004). Plaintiff, however, has not appealed any
decision relating to the unlawful detainer. The order of the lower court to dismiss that
matter is not appealed. What is being appealed is the wrongful inclusion of language and
the award of attorney fees that were not awarded previously by the court. Because the issue
being appealed is not the decision regarding unlawful detainer, but rather the wrongful
inclusion of language and award of attorney fees, when no such language or award was
1

made, the appeal should be made within 30 days as it was in this case. See Hawkins v.
Callahan, 2001 Ut. App. 343, a copy of which appears as Exhibit 1 in the appendix to this
memorandum.
II.

Defendants' Proposed Order Goes Beyond the Direction of the Lower
Court and Violates the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In March of 2003, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in this matter. See Ct. Rec.
p. 69-11. In June of that same year, after the matter had been duly briefed, the Parties each
participated in a hearing with regard to the specific issues raised. As has been argued by
both parties to this appeal, the lower court dismissed this matter and instructed Defendants
to "prepare an order dismissing the complaint in accordance with the arguments raised in
your motion." See June 13th transcript, at In. 5-7. Not at any time during the June 13th
hearing was the issue of attorney fees, bad faith, nor fraud brought before the lower court
for determination. See June 13th transcript. Rather, the issue before the court was strictly
confined to whether or not the matter should be dismissed. See/d. at p. 15, In. 1-3. The
lower court's direction, at the end of that hearing, during which the issue of attorney fees,
bad faith, nor fraud were ever broached, was to submit and order consistent with the
arguments raised in Defendants' motion.

There is a clear "Argument" section of

Defendants'memorandum. SeeCt. Rec. p. 66-64. Defendants made arguments that they
were the rightful owners of the property1, and that plaintiff did not have an interest in the
property because the party from whom plaintiff purchased the property did not have an

^eeCt. Rec. p. 66.
2

interest in it.2 Nowhere in the arguments presented to the lower court by Defendants is any
mention of fraud. There is no mention in the arguments of bad faith. There is no mention
in the arguments of an award of attorney fees.
To be clear, there is mention in the conclusion and the introduction of "bad faith" but
it is in no way supported or referenced to at any part of the argument. Similarly a request
for attorney fees is made in the conclusion, but again it is not referenced to at any part of the
argument. The clear order of the court stated that Defendants were to "prepare an order
dismissing the complaint in accordance with the arguments raised in your motion." Id., at
In. 5-7, emphasis added. It did not order or authorize an order to be prepared with every
request they had made, only in accordance with the arguments raised in the motion. To
include an award of attorney fees, and language finding bad faith and fraud was in direct
contradiction to the order of the court, Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration,
and current Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that fraud be plead
with particularity. Fraud was never even mentioned, at any part of this matter, neither in the
pleadings or hearings until Defendants presented their order six months after the court had
made its order.

III.

2

Defendants' Order Violates the Law of the Case.

SeeCt. Rec. p. 65.
3

Defendant next argues that the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable and that
somehow Plaintiff's argument with regard to that doctrine is somehow an attempt to mislead
the Court. Plaintiff denies both accusations. First, the law of the case doctrine is applicable.
While Plaintiff recognizes that there are several branches of the doctrine, it certainly does
apply in this situation. The "law of the case" doctrine prevents a judge from reconsidering
all his previous final orders. See Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 24 P.3d 984 (Utah
2001). It is a difficult argument for Defendants to make that the order made on June 13,
2003 was not a final order of the lower court. It adjudicated each and every claim Plaintiff
had before it, which is the very standard upon which the doctrine is applicable. See Id. at.
992. The lower court was not reconsidering any final order. The order of the lower court
was to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety. Each claim was subject to final
adjudication. There were no remaining and pending claims. The order of the lower court
was for Defendants "to prepare an order dismissing the complaint in accordance with the
arguments raised in your motion." Id., at In. 5-7, emphasis added. That was the order
of the court and law of the case. Defendants did not comply with the order of the court and
the lower court did not comply with the law of the case in allowing the extra-judicial
amendments to be made to Defendants' order.
IV.

Defendants' Order Should Be Stricken for its Untimely Submission.

Defendants cite Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, \ 21, for the proposition that
it was harmless error to prepare and file their order six months after the court had made its
order. Covey defines harmless error as "an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that [the
4

court can] conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings." Id. at \2\.

That is exactly the opposite of what happened in this case.

Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an order be submitted within
15 days of the ruling of the Court. See Ut. R. Civ. Proc. 7(f)(2). Rule 4-504 of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration required the same. The purpose for that requirement is
discernibly so that orders are submitted within a close enough time as to ensure that it
complies with the order of the court without memories having faded or other outside
influences affecting the result. In this case, although not ordered by the court nor argued for,
six months later, Defendants included an additional award of attorney fees and additional
conclusions of law that Plaintiffs had acted fraudulently and in bad faith, which were not
raised in the original arguments nor previously ruled on by the court. Dismissal of an action
is one thing. A finding of bad faith, fraud, and an award of a significant amount of attorney
fees is an entirely different thing. It severely prejudiced this Plaintiff for such a large
amount of time to pass and for Defendants to directly disobey not just the court's order but
also the rules governing their behavior. The Utah Rules of Professionalism and Civility,
Rule 8, provides as follows: "When permitted or required by the court rule or otherwise,
lawyers shall draft orders that accurately and completely reflect the court's ruling." Here the
Defendant did not do that. That is not inconsequential and it has affected the outcome of
these proceedings.
V.

Defendants' Attorney Fee Affidavit is Insufficient, Does Not Comply with
the Rules of Judicial Administration, and Should Therefore Be Stricken.

5

During the January 9, 2004 hearing before Judge Backlund in this matter, Plaintiff
brought the attorney fee and its reasonableness to that court's attention. See January 9,2004
transcript, p. 12. The transcript from that hearing clearly demonstrates that those issues
were properly presented to the lower court and preserved for appeal contrary to the
assertions of Defendants. Counsel for the Defendants' attorney fee affidavit was not only
excessive in its request, it was inadequate. To award the fees was error, to affirm the fees
based upon an inadequate affidavit was further error, and for which the affidavit should be
stricken.
The Utah Supreme Court in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988)
held that an award made without adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of
discretion and must be overruled. Id; Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah Ct.App.
1988).
Under Rule 4-505(1) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Affidavits in
support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifically
the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the number
of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter
to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees
for comparable legal services.
Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, as well as Rule 73 provide
the requirements for an attorney fee affidavit. Defendants' affidavit was inadequate under
those standards. Defendant argues that even though it admittedly did not comply with those
6

requirements that it was sufficient, and this further mistake was one again of harmless error.
It was not harmless error however. It appears that Defendants include work from other
cases, which is referenced by the lower court. See transcript, p. 17 That was not harmless
error for attorney fees to be included for work not even involved in this case. Furthermore,
there is no possible way for Plaintiff or the court to determine what work was done on this
case and what was done on another case. Nor does it specify who did the work, what their
hourly fee was, or that the work was reasonably necessary. It simply falls short in every
respect.
In Hall v. NACMIntermountain, Jnc, 988 P.2d 942 (Utah 2001), the Supreme Court
held that because both the court and counsel were aware of the legal basis for seeking
attorney fees, there was no prejudice from a failure to state a legal basis in the affidavit.
Defendant argues that all parties knew the basis for the award. In this case, however,
nobody, not the lower court, nor the Plaintiff were ever aware of any legal basis for seeking
attorney fees. The subject was never even mentioned by any party during the hearing on this
matter. There certainly is prejudice where a party surprises another with an unsubstantiated
award of attorney fees six months after a court's ruling, where such an award had never been
made. The attorney fee award was surprise and improper. The attorney fee affidavit was
further insufficient and should be stricken.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully requests this
Court reverse the error made by the Fourth District Court in this matter and require the
7

Court to enter an Order which follows the actual decision of the Court. The award of
attorney's fees and the finding of bad faith should both be stricken from the final Order
of the lower Court.

DATED this

\j

day of March, 2005.

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN

Denver C>Snuffer, Jr
Daftiel B. Garriott
Attorney for Appellant
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HAWKINS v. CALLAHAN, 2001

UT App

343

John B. Hawkins, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tom Callahan, Defendant
and Appellant.
Case No. 20000550-CA.
Utah Court of Appeals.
Filed November 16, 2001.
(Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable
Robert K. Hilder.
Thor B. Roundy, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Shawn D. Turner, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Tom Callahan appeals from a judgment finding him to be
in unlawful detainer and limiting damages on his counterclaim.
Appellee John Hawkins contends that this court lacks jurisdiction
because the appeal was untimely. The notice of appeal was timely filed
following entry of the written order disposing of Callahan's motion under
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That order clarified that
the motion had not been previously considered and disposed of Hawkins'
claim that the original judgment implicitly denied the post-trial
motion. Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a
notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after entry of an order
disposing of one of the enumerated post-trial motions. Therefore,
Callahan's appeal was timely.
Prior to trial, the court entered an order granting Callahan's Motion
for Order Establishing Admissions. The requests for admissions included
admissions that a document attached to the requests was a true and
correct copy of the lease agreement signed by the parties and another
document was a true and correct copy of a rental receipt and lease
extension signed by the parties. Over Callahan's objection, the court
allowed Hawkins's testimony that the lease and purported extension were
altered by Callahan after Hawkins signed them. The trial court found that
(1) Callahan's testimony was not credible; (2) he altered the lease after
it was signed; and (3) the card that allegedly extended the lease was not
prepared and signed in the form presented to the court. The court thus
found that the lease term was not extended, Callahan occupied the
property on a month to month tenancy after March 15, 1998, and that
tenancy terminated as of June 14, 1998. Accordingly, Hawkins was entitled
to recover the property and its rental value from June 14 to August 15,
1998. Callahan contends the trial court erred in setting aside the
admissions.
Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows withdrawal or
amendment of an admission "when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission
fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits." Id. Under the
circumstances, we determine that Hawkins's opposition to the motion for
an order seeking to have the admissions deemed admitted was sufficient as
a request to amend or withdraw the admissions. The issue on appeal is

wneuner une triai court properiy applied, or a e c u n e a uo appiy, tine
requirements of Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah
1998) .
The district court concluded that Langeland would not prevent the court
from considering whether fraud or forgery occurred. Callahan's counsel
conceded at the beginning of the trial that the court could examine
additional facts regardless of the admissions. Although the court did not
explicitly apply the Langeland tests, we conclude that the trial court
satisfied the requirements of that case in setting aside admissions. In
Langeland, the supreme court stated:
To show that a presentation of the merits of an action would
be served by amendment or withdrawal of an
admission, the party seeking amendment or
withdrawal must (1) show that the matters deemed
admitted against it are relevant to the merits of
the underlying cause of action, and (2) introduce
some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific
facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted
against it are m fact untrue.
Id. at 1062. Whether the lease was extended was clearly relevant. Hawkins
testified that (1) he did not execute the receipt while it included the
extension language; (2) the extension pre-dated by two months the only
discussion between the parties regarding an extension; and (3) he refused
to grant an extension because he planned to sell the property. Given the
sworn testimony, including specific facts indicating the admissions were
untrue, the trial court did not err in setting aside the admission and
determining whether the lease had been extended. Based upon the evidence
and the trial court's assessment of Callahan's credibility, the finding
that the purported extension was a forgery was not clearly erroneous.
Callahan's assertion that he was prejudiced is a bare recitation of
Langeland. He has not identified any witness or item of evidence that was
not available to him at trial and has not established prejudice. See id.
at 1063 (stating prejudice requires showing that the party is less able
to obtain evidence required to prove the admitted matter than at the time
admission was made).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion, as limited by Langeland,
in setting aside the admissions as to the lease terms and the extension.
Our affirmance of this ruling is dispositive of the remaining issues
pertaining to wrongful eviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Judith M. Billings, Judge, James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. 0trine,
Judge.
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